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N/A: Recent Decisions

RECENT DECISIONS
Administrative Law-PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE-FEDERAL MARITIME COMMISSION'S SUBPOENA POWER EXTENDS TO DOCUMENTS LOCATED OUTSIDE THE
UNITED STATES EVEN THOUGH STATUTE AUTHORIZING ISSUANCE OF SUBPOENAS
RyEFERS ONLY TO PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS FROM ANY PLACE IN THE UNITED
STATE.-When respondents' filed notice of general transportation rate in-

creases .with the Federal Maritime Commission,2 petitioner shipper 3 responded by filing a formal complaint 4 alleging that the proposed rate
increases were unreasonably high.5 Petitioner then requested that the
Commission issue subpoenas duces tecum to compel the production of
documents from "wherever located," even though some of the documents
were located outside the United States. The Commission issued the subpoenas,6 and, when the respondents refused to comply, a federal district
court ordered compliance. 7 On appeal, held, enforcement order affirmed.
1 Respondents were officers or agents of shipping companies which were all members
of the Calcutta, East Coast of India and East Pakistan/U.S.A. Conference (the Calcutta
Conference) and engaged in the transportation of commodities by water from foreign
ports to the United States. Such a steamship conference has been defined as "a formal
association of steamship lines ... having for their purpose the reaching of common agreement among their members with respect to transportation rates and other conditions of
carriage of goods and passengers." Ludlow Corp. v. De Smedt, 249 F. Supp. 490, 497 n.1
(S.D.N.Y. 1966). See generally Note, Rate Regulation in Ocean Shipping, 78 HARV. L. Ryv.
635-38 (1965).
2 Shipping companies are required to file with the Commission copies of every agreement with another carrier fixing or regulating transportation rates or fares. Shipping Act
of 1916 § 15, 46 U.S.C. § 814 (1964).
8 Ludlow Corporation was allowed by the District Court to intervene in the enforcement proceedings brought by the Federal Maritime Commission. The proceeding brought
by Ludlow was consolidated with the proceeding brought by the Commission.
4 Section 22 of the Shipping Act of 1916 provides, in relevant, part:
Any person may file with the Federal Maritime Board a sworn complaint setting
forth any violation of this chapter by a common carrier by water, or other person
subject to this chapter, and asking reparation for the injury, if any, caused thereby.
46 U.S.C. § 821 (1964). Pursuant to § 103(a) of Reorganization Plan No. 7 of 1961, 75 Stat.
840, all the functions vested in the Federal Maritime Board were transferred to the
Federal Maritime Commission. 26 Fed. Reg. 7315 (1961).
5 If the Commission had found the proposed rates to be unreasonably high, the rate
increase would have been in violation of §§ 14(b), 15, and 18(b)(5) of the Shipping Act.
46 U.S.C. §§ 813(a), 814, 817(b)(5) (1964).
6 Section 27 of the Shipping Act of 1916 provides in part:
For the purpose of investigating alleged violations of this chapter, the Federal
Maritime Board may by subpoena compel the attendance of witnesses and the
production of books, papers, documents, and other evidence from any place in the
United States at any designated place of hearing.
46 U.S.C. § 826 (1964). (Emphasis added.)
7 Ludlow Corp. v. DeSmedt, 249 F. Supp. 496, 503 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
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Even though the statute giving the Federal Maritime Commission power
to issue subpoenas refers only to the production of documents "from any
place in the United States,"8 the Commission's subpoena power extends to
documents located without the United States. Federal Maritime Comm'n
v. DeSmedt, 366 F.2d 464 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 974 (1966).
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide broad discovery proce-

dures which allow parties to an action to obtain documents in the possession, custody, or control of another party9 or a person not a party to the
action.' 0 However, these discovery procedures do not apply to federal
administrative agency actions," and thus an administrative agency is
generally powerless to issue subpoenas to effectuate discovery unless authorized to do so by statute. 2 Even if such a statute grants subpoena power
8 Shipping Act of 1916 § 27, 46 U.S.C. § 826 (1964).
34.02[1] (2d ed. 1938). See gen9 See FEa. R. Cv. P. 34; 4 MooRE, FEDEa. PRAcTc
34.01-34.21 (2d ed. 1938, Supp. 1965).
erally id.
10 See FED. R. Civ.*P. 45(b), which provides for issuance of subpoenas duces tecum. For
a discussion of the relationship between Rule 34 and the subpoena duces tecum provided
34.02.
for in Rule 45(b), see 4 Mooaa, FEEaA. PaGczE, op. cit. supra note 9,
11 General Committee Note of 1937 to Rule 45, in 5 MooRa, FEDERAL PRACTIE 5 45.012]
(2d ed. 1958) (Rule 45); see Okun v. Kastner, 1 F.R.D. 599 (D.R.L 1941) (Rule 84); Bowles
v. Coal & Supply Corp., 152 F.2d 330 (2d Cir. 1945) (all Rules).
The committee note to Rule 45 provides:
It
subpoenas duces tecum issued by the district court ....
[Rule 45] applies to...
does not apply to the enforcement of subpoenas issued by administrative officers and
commissions pursuant to statutory authority. The enforcement of such subpoenas by

the district courts is regulated by appropriate statutes.
5 Mooap, FnEnam PaAcric op. cit. supra.
It should be noted that a 1946 amendment to the Rules added the following provision:
These rules apply (1) to proceedings to compel the ... production of documents

in accordance with a subpoena issued by an officer or agency of the United States
under any statute of the United States except as otherwise provided by statute ....
FED. R. Cirv. P. 81(a)(3). It Was held in Boeing Airplane Co. v. Coggesball, 280 F.2d 654,
658-59 (D.C. Cir. 1960), that because of the provisions of Rule 81(a)(3) the limitations
found in Rules 30(b) and 45(b) and (d) are directly applicable to administrative subpoenas. Other courts, however, have stressed the distinction between the administrative
proceeding and the court action to enforce the subpoena, Long Beach Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 189 F. Supp. 589 (S.D. Cal 1960), reu'd on other
grounds, 295 F.2d 403 (9th Cir. 1961). (Arguments which try to equate the twvo go "too
far."); Falsone v. United States, 205 F.2d 734, 742 (5th Cir. 1953).
12 Cooper, Federal Agency Investigations: Requirements for the Production of Docu-

ments, 60 Mics. L. REv. 187, 188 (1961); see Cudahy Packing Co. v. Holland, 315 U.S. 357
(1942); Shasta Mtinerals and Chem. Co. v. SEC, 328 F.2d 285 (10th Cir. 1964) (by implication).
The Federal Administrative Procedure Act reflects awareness of this principle in § 6(c),
which provides in part:
Agency subpoenas authorized by law shall be issued to any party upon request and,
as may be required by rules of procedure, upon a statement or showing of general
relevance and reasonable scope of the evidence sought.

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/glr/vol1/iss3/7

2

N/A: Recent Decisions

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. I

to an administrative agency, its powers are not unlimited, but are derived
from and are limited by the authorizing statute.'$ However, administrative
agencies may be able to obtain documents without invoking their subpoena

powers by demanding the production of requested materials under specific
14
statutes which "require production" of certain kinds of documents and

invoking penalties for noncompliance.', Under these statutes which require production of requested documentary evidence, the agencies' powers
are not limited only to the production of documents located within the
United States. 16 Furthermore, under a statute'

7

giving the Securities Ex-

change Commission power to subpoena documents "from any place in the
5 U.S.C. § 1005(c) (1964). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure state that the rules do not
apply to proceedings to enforce federal administrative subpoenas "except as otherwise provided by statute ... " FED. R. Civ. P. 81(a) (3).
However, it is established that an administrative agency is not required to show that the
defendant from whom information is sought comes within the coverage of the statute being
administered by the agency. E.g., Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Perkins, 317 U.S. 501 (1943);
Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41 (1938); see 1 DAvis, ADMINIsTRATIVE LAW
§ 3.12 (1958).
18 See, e.g., United States v. Morton Salt Co., 38 U.S. 632, 647-54 (1950); State ex rel.
R.R. & Warehouse Comm'n v. Mees, 235 Minn. 42, 49 N.W.2d 886 (1951).
Thus an administrative agency must use its subpoena power only for lawful purposes
which are within the power of the legislature to command, and may not act arbitrarily
or in excess of the agency's lawful authority. See Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 827
U.S. 186, 214-18 (1945); Note, Non-coverage as a Defense Against Judicial Enforcement of
Administrative Subpoenas, 56 YALE L.J. 165 (1946).
14 E.g., § 21 of the Shipping Act, 46 U.S.C. § 820 (1964); § 20(1) of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 20(1) (1964).
Section 21 of the Shipping Act provides, in part:
The Federal Maritime Board ... may require any common carrier by water, or other
person subject to this chapter, ... to file with it ... any periodical or special report,
or any account, record, rate, or charge, or any memorandum of any facts and transactions appertaining to the business of such carrier ....

46 U.S.C. § 820 (1964).
15 Ibid. This section states:
Whoever fails to file any report, account, record, rate charge, or memorandum as required by this section shall forfeit to the United States the sum of $100 for each day
of such default.
Section 20(7) of the Interstate Commerce Act provides for a penalty not to exceed $500
"for each such offense and for each day during which such refusal continues." 49 U.S.C.
§ 20(7)(a) (1964).
16 Montship Lines, Ltd. v. Federal Maritime Bd., 295 F.2d 147, 154 (D.C. Cir. 1961)
(Shipping Act § 21); see Kerr S.S. Co. v. United States, 284 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1960), appeal
dismissed, 369 U.S. 442 (1962) (Shipping Act § 21). In Montship, the court further stated
that "it is questionable whether the Board is in fact powerless under § 27 to subpoena
documents outside the territorial confines of the United States." Montship Lines, Ltd. v.
Federal Maritime Board, supra at 153.
17 Securities Act of 1933 § 19(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77s(b) (1964).
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United States,"'s the Commission was held to have the power to require
the production of documents located in a foreign country. °
Is Ibid. This section provides in part:
For the purpose of all investigations which, in the opinion of the Commission, are
necessary and proper for the enforcement of this sub-chapter. any member of the Comempowered to administer oaths and affirmations, subpoena witneses,
mission ... [is]

take evidence, and require the production of any books, papers, or other documents
which the Commission deems relevant or material to the inquiry. Such attendance of
witnesses and the production of such documentary evidence may be required from any
place in the United States or any Territory at any designated place of hearing.
(Emphasis added.)
19 SEC v. Minas De Artemisa, S.A., 150 F.2d 215 (9th Cir. 1945) (documents in Mexico);
Mines & Metals Corp. v. SEC, 200 F.2d 317, 320 (9th. Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 845 US. 941
(1953) (records located in Panama). Both the Minas and the Mines & Metals Corp. cases
arose under Section 19(b) of the Securities Act of 1933, see notes 17 and 18 supra and accompanying text, which is a true "subpoena" statute similar to the one in the instant case,
see note 6 supra, and not a statute which "requires the production" of certain kinds of
documents. See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
It is well established that the fact that a document is located in a foreign country is not
a valid ground for its nonproduction when a subpoena which requires its production has
been issued. In the case of In re Equitable Plan Co., 185 F. Supp. 57 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), the
court stated:
The general rule is that a foreign corporation doing business in the district is subject
to process, induding subpoenas duces tecum; and it must produce its records and documents even though they are outside the United States.
Id. at 59; see e.g., In re Electric 9- Musical Indust., Ltd., 155 F. Supp. 892 (S.D.N.Y.).
petition for mandamus denied, 249 F.2d 308 (2d Cir. 1957); In re Grand Jury Subpoenas
Duces Tecum, 72 F. Supp. 1013 (S.D.N.Y. 1947). Such subpoenas may be enforced when it
is within the "power" or "control' of the party to whom the subpoena is directed to produce the requested documents. See, e.g., Society Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 204
(1958); In re Harris, 27 F. Supp. 480 (S.D.N.Y. 1939). The Harris court stated the rule:
The force of a subpoena for production of documentary evidence generally reaches
all documents under the control of the person or corporation ordered to produce,
saving questions of privilege and unreasonableness, and it makes no difference that a
particular document is kept at a place beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the court
that issues the subpoena. The test is one of control, not of location.
Id. at 481; accord, First Nat'1 City Bank v. IRS, 271 F.2d 616 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied,
361 U.S. 948 (1960); In re Nat1 Pub. Util. Investing Corp., 79 F.2d 302 (2d Cir. 1935) (records
in control of liquidator in Canada); Cronan v. Schilling, 100 N.Y. Supp. 2d 474 (Sup. Ct.
1950); Wright, Discovery, 35 F.R.D. 80 (1964); Note, Meaning of "Control" in Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure34, 107 U. PA. L. Rav. 103 (1958).
Courts have on occasion recognized the extreme difficulty, inconvenience, or expense
sometimes necessary to produce that which is required in a subpoena duces tecum, and have
refused to enforce the subpoena under those circumstances. See, e.g., Coovey Oil Co. v.
Continental Oil Co., 340 F.2d 993 (10th Cir. 1965); Munroe v. United States, 216 Fed. 107
(1st Cir. 1914) (papers in possession of partner in France); Hanover Shoe Corp. v. United
Shoe Mach. Corp., 207 F. Supp. 407 (M.D. Pa. 1962).
Where the production of the materials called for in the subpoena would be violative of
the laws of the foreign country in which they are located, the courts will not enforce the

subpoena. See, e.g., lags v. Ferguson, 282 F.2d 149 (2d Cir. 1960); Application of Chase Man-

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/glr/vol1/iss3/7

4

N/A: Recent Decisions

552

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 1

It would seem that under a statute giving an administrative agency
20
power to subpoena documents "from any place in the United States,"
the courts would be extremely reluctant to expand the agency's subpoena
power to documents located in foreign countries. However, on a few occasions, when presented with the opportunity to do so, courts have permitted
the subpoenaing of documents from abroad by an administrative agency
pursuant to a statute which plainly gives the agency the power to subpoena
documents located within the United States. 21 In order to accomplish this
result the courts had to refuse, as the Second Circuit has done in the instant
case, to acknowledge any "plain meaning" approach to statutory interpreta.
tion,22 and look instead to legislative history.
The Shipping Act of 191623 which in section 27 grants subpoena power

to the Federal Maritime Commission was modeled after a similar provision
in the only federal act which at that time regulated common carriers, the
Interstate Commerce Act. 24 Originally there was no provision in the Interhattan Bank, 192 F. Supp. 817 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), aff'd, 297 F.2d 611 (2d Cir. 1962) (violation
of laws of Panama). However, where it appears that upon application to the foreign sovcreign permission to produce the materials which the subpoena calls for will be granted, the
subpoenaed party will be required to make such application before the courts will excuse
him. Ibid.
It has also been held that a corporation may not resist production of documents located
abroad by simply passing a by-law or resolution which prohibits the removal of the documents from its home office abroad. E.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum, supra.
20 Shipping Act of 1916 § 27, 46 U.S.C. § 826 (1964).
21 E.g., Mines & Metals Corp. v. SEC, 200 F.2d 317 (9th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S.
941 (1953); SEC v. Minas de Artemisa, S.A., 150 F.2d 215 (9th Cir. 1945).
22 Respondents argued in the instant case that § 27 of the Shipping Act of 1916, 46 U.S.C.
§ 826 (1964), "has such a plain meaning that we must perforce attribute to Congress a deep.
seated intention to reach this irrational result." Federal Maritime Comm'n v. DeSmedt, 866
F.2d 464, 469 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 974 (1966). To this argument the Second Circuit replied:
Respondent's "plain meaning" approach has long since ceased to have this court's
adherence; Judge Learned Hand was not preaching novel doctrine when he Instructed
more than twenty years ago: "There is no surer way to misTead any document than
to read it literally."
Ibid. (citation omitted.); see Cabell v. Markham, 148 F.2d 787, 73940 (2d Cir.), afl'd, 826
U.S. 404 (1945); L. HAND; THE SPMUT OF LmraTY 106 (1960 ed.).
The dissenting, judge in the instant case preferred, nevertheless, the "plain meaning"
interpretation:
If Congress had intended to enact legislation authorizing such production "from any
place in the world," it is again to be presumed that it had available sufficiently skilled
legislative draftsmen who could have used "world" instead ot "United Statcs"-a not
altogether too difficult bit of draftsmanship.
Federal Maritime Comm'n v. DeSmedt, 366 F.2d 464, 474 (2d Cir. 1966) (dissenting opinion
of Moore, J.).
28 39 Stat. 728 (1916), as amended, 46 U.S.C. §§ 801-42 (1964).
24 Compare the text of § 27 of the Shipping Act of 1916, 46 U.S.C. § 826 (1964), with the
text of § 12 of the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887. Section 12 provided in part:
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state Commerce Act which limited the subpoena power of the ICC to the
United States.2 5 However, the act was amended in 1891, and a new provi-

sion allowing the ICC to subpoena witnesses and evidence "from any place
in.the United States" was added.2 6 In passing this amendment Congress was
approving the Commission's requests to insure that its subpoena power
was not limited to requiring the attendance of witnesses from within the
district of witness' residence. 27 Thus, the passage of the amendment was in
no way indicative of Congress' intention to limit the territorial jurisdiction
of the agency's subpoena power, but suggests, rather, that Congress desired
to expand that jurisdiction and thus overcome any lessor territorial limitations which might have existed and which would have hindered the Commission's work. 28 Therefore, when Congress passed the Shipping Act of
[F]or the purposes of this act the Commission shall have power to require the . . .

production of... documents relating to any matter under investigation, and to that
end may invoke the aid of any court of the United States in requiring the attendance
and testimony of witnesses and the production of books, papers, and documents ....
And any of the circuit courts of the United States within the jurisdiction of which
such inquiry is carried on may, in case of contumacy or refusal to obey a subpoena
issued to any common carrier... issue an order requiring such common carrier or
other person to appear before said Commission (and produce books and papers if so
ordered) ....
24 Stat. 383, as amended, 49 US.C. § 12 (1964). Two years after this section was enacted,
Congress clarified § 12 by adding:
Alnd for the purposes of this act the Commission shall have the power to require, by
subpoena, the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production of all . . .
documents relating to any matter under investigation ....
Amendment to Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, 25 Stat. 859 (1889), as amended, 49 U.S.C.
§ 12 (1964). (Emphasis added.)
Congressman Alexander, the chief sponsor of the Shipping Act of 1916, when speaking
for the bill when it was on the floor of the House, stated:
The provisions of Section 27 relating to the power of the board to compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of documents any and other evidence are also
substantially similar to those of the interstate-commerce act....
53 CoxG. REc. 8081 (1916); see IL. R Pt.No. 659, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. 33 (1916).
25 Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, 24 Stat. 883, as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 12 (1964).
26 26 Stat. 743 (1891). The amendment added the following clause:
Such attendance of witnesses, and the production of such documentary evidence, may
be required from any place in the United States, at any designated place of hearing.
ibid. (Emphasis added.)
27 See 3 ICC ANN. RE'. 108 (1889) which states:
Objection has been made that the attendance of witnesses can not be required outside
of the judicial district in which they reside. The Commission believes the objection Is
not well founded, and that the law could not be effectually administered under such a
rule. As the fact that the objection has been made indicates that obstructions and
delays may occur, it is better that the language of the act should be open to no misconstruction.
An 1890 report, 4 ICC ANN. REP. 68 (1890), reiterates the contentions made in the Commission's report of the previous year.
28 See SEC v. Minas de Artemisa, SA., 150 F.2d 215, 218 (9th Cir. 1945). Under the Fed.
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1916, it copied the provisions relating to the subpoena powers of the Federal Maritime Commission from the Interstate Commerce Act and its
amendments that were in effect at that time, indicating that it was Congress' intent to impute to the Shipping Act's subpoena sections any inter.
pretation that had previously been given to the similar sections of the
Interstate Commerce Act. 29
The policy reasons which prompted the Second Circuit to decide in favor
of the Maritime Commission are strong. Federal administrative agencies
must be allowed to conduct hearings and issue subpoenas to obtain inforeral Rules of Civil Procedure, a subpoena may be served at any place within the district In
which the hearing or trial is to be held, or at any place that is within 100 miles of the place

of the hearing or trial; and, "when a statute of the United States provides therefor, the
court . . . may authorize the service of a subpoena at any other place." Fan. R. Cv. P.
45(e)(1). These territorial restrictions would severely limit the effectiveness of administrative subpoenas, since most federal agencies generally hold their hearings in Washington,
D.C., and could not issue subpoenas beyond the territorial limits of Rule 45 If the Rules
did apply to the agencies, unless a statute indicated otherwise.
29 See notes 24-27 supra and accompanying text.
Appellants also relied heavily upon the attempt by the Federal Maritime Commission In
1961 to have Congress augment the Commission's regulatory authority by providing for a
method by which foreign documents could be subpoenaed. See Brief for Appellants, pp.
42-44, Federal Maritime Comm'n v. DeSmedt, 866 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1966). The request was
prompted in part by the attack in Montship Lines, Ltd. v. Federal Maritime Board, 295
F.2d 147 (D.C. Cir. 1961), upon the Commission's authority under § 21 of the Shipping
Act of 1916 to subpoena documents from abroad. See Legislative History of the Steamship
Conference/Dual Rate Law, S. Doe. No. 100, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 134, 186-39 (1962). Tile
Montship case was pending in the court of appeals and was decided in favor of the maritime agency before the Senate considered the changes proposed in the House bill. Ibid. The
Montship decision, which held that the Commission could subpoena records from abroad
under § 21, seemed to make the suggested changes in the act unnecessary, and therefore the
Senate deleted them. Ibid. The Senate Committee had also received protests by some twelve
friendly maritime nations that the proposed changes infringed upon their territorial sovereignty by extending the United States' subpoena into their countries. Id. at 141-44. The
State Department was most concerned and suggested that Congress defer consideration of
the proposed changes until such time as "the matter is thoroughly explored to determine
how this Government can secure the cooperation of foreign governments in a program which
will provide the information essential to the performance of its responsibilities." Id. at
143-44. Thus, the legislative history of the 1961 amendments indicates that Congress heeded
the request of the State Department so as not to antagonize foreign nations. This, in addition to the favorable decision in Montship, seemed to Congress to make it unnecessary to
amend the Shipping Act of 1916, and thus, contrary to the appellant's contention, the lack
of passage on the part of Congress in 1961 of the proposed changes in the Act are not Indicative of Congress' desire to limit the Commission's subpoena power to documents located
within the United States. Id. at 136-46. The Second Circuit reiterated the Supreme Court's
warning in Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 47 (1950), that there is no Inference
"that an agency admits that it is acting upon a wrong construction by seeking ratification
from Congress. Public policy requires that agencies feel free to ask legislation which will
terminate or avoid adverse contentions and litigations." Federal Maritime Comm'n v. De.
Smedt, 366 F.2d 464, 473 (2d Cir. 1966).
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mation from those individuals or organizations over whom the agencies
are charged with the responsibility of regulation. It matters little from a
policy standpoint whether the documents the agency seeks to examine are
located within the United States or are within the jurisdiction of a foreign
nation, so long as the individual or organization to whom the subpoena is
issued is within the jurisdiction of the United States.30
The decision in the instant case is significant since, as Judge Friendly's
opinion indicated, 3 ' it would apply not only to the Federal Maritime Commission, but to other federal agencies as well. Consequently, in addition to
the Federal Maritime Commission and the Securities Fxchange Commission, many other federal agencies, including tie Interstate Commerce
Commission, 32 the Federal Trade Commission,as the National Labor Relations Board, 34 the Civil Aeronautics Board,35 and the Secretary of Agriculture,26 may use the authority of DeSmedt to require those under the
respective agencies' jurisdiction to respond to administrative subpoenas
and produce requested documents and records from abroad. In view of
the fact that many of these federal agencies could require the production
of documents from abroad under their mandatory reporting statutes,3 7 it
would be futile to maintain double standards by allowing the agencies to
obtain documents from abroad by invoking these mandatory reporting
statutes, but not by use of the subpoena. 38 It is not unlikely that many of

the important documents which federal agencies need will be found abroad,
30 See SEC v. Minas De Artemisa, S.A.., 150 F.2d 215 (9th Cir. 1945), in which the court
stated:
We are satisfied that [the SEC subpoena statute] was intended broadly to empower the

Commission to require the attendance of witnesses or the production of documentary
evidence at any designated place of hearing, provided only that service of the subpoena
is made within the territorial limits of the United States. The obligation to respond
applies even though the person served may find it necessary to go to some other place
within or without the United States in order to obtain the documents required to be
produced.
Id. at 218. (Emphasis added.)
31 Federal Maritime Comm'n v. DeSmedt, 866 F.2d 464, 469 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385
U.S. 974 (1966).
32 See 49 U.S.C. § 12 (1964).
33 See 15 U.S.C. § 49 (1964).
34 See 29 U.S.C. § 161 (1964).
35 See 49 U.S.C. § 1484 (1964).
36 See 7 U.S.C. § 222 (1964).
37 See notes 14 & 15 supra and accompanying text.
38 The court in the instant case reached this conclusion when it stated:
Indeed, if the Commission had chosen to proceed under § 21 of the Shipping Act, it
could have required that substantially the same information sought in these subpoenas
be furnished from foreign countries.
Federal Maritime Comm'n v. DeSmedt, 366 F.2d 464, 469 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
974 (1966).
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and it is obvious that "the administration of federal acts cannot turn upon
the incidental or accidental, or even intentional location of documents.
"39

Torts-DuTy

AND NEGLIGENCE-WHERE

OWNER SHOULD ANTICIPATE A

CUSTOMER'S ACCIDENT DUE TO PARKING LOT ICE HAZARD, OWNER Is LIABLE
FOR SUBSEQUENT SUP-AND-FALL INJURY, EVEN THOUGH THE DANGER WAS
OBvious TO THE CusToME.-Plaintiff-shopper sued defendant-shopping

center to recover for personal injuries sustained from a fall on an unnatural
accumulation of rough ice on the defendant's parking lot. Plaintiff alleged
that the defendant was negligent in failing to remove a patch of old snow
and ice which had become dangerous and in failing to take any precaution
to make the slippery patch reasonably safe. There had been no snowfall for
two days prior to the accident, and the defendant's sidewalks and parking lot
had been entirely cleared of snow except for the patch upon which the
plaintiff fell.1 The trial court, following the traditional Iowa rule,2
89

Ludlow Corp. v. DeSmedt, 249 F. Supp. 496, 502 (SMD.N.Y. 1966), afj'd sub nor, red.

eral Maritime Comm'n v. DeSmedt, 366 F.2d 464 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 974 (1966).

1 Evidence in the trial court indicated that the ice patch was approximately five by
one hundred fifty feet and paralleled the sidewalk adjacent to the curb. It appeared to
have been an accumulation caused when tenants swept their storefront sidewalks into the
already cleared parking area. More than seven inches of snow had fallen over a one Week
period which ended two days prior to the accident. Nevertheless, the plaintiff's pleddings
failed to specify either the exact nature of the hazard or its duration prior to the
accident. Moreover, although she testified that inadequate lighting prevented her- from
seeing or appreciating the hazard, she made no specific allegation of this condition. As a
result of these pleading deficiencies, the dissenting judges agreed with the trial judge that
the plaintiff had failed to prove actionable negligence, thereby justifying the directed
verdict. The majority decision, however; relied on a state rule of civil procedure, 58
IowA CODE ANN., Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 344(f)(2), governing review of directed
verdicts for the defendant, to "give plaintiff's evidence the most favorable construction
it will reasonably bear." This reasoning was sharply criticized by the dissenting judges,
in the 5-4 decision, who thought the instant decision would establish an unreasonable
standard of absolute liability on parking lot owners who must annually combat severe
winter weather at an already considerable expense.
2 Christianson v. Kramer, 255 Iowa 259, 243, 122 N.W.2d 283, 286 (1963); Atherton v.
Hoenig's Grocery, 249 Iowa 50, 54, 86 N.W.2d 252, 255 (1957); accord, Trimyer v. Norfolk
Tallow Co., 192 Va. 776, 66 S.E. 2d 441, 444 (1951). Compare RISrA ENT, TORS § 343
(1934), with RESrATESmENT (SECOND), ToRTs §§ 343 and 348A (1965). In Christianson the
court held that the owner had no duty to protect his customer from obvious hazards, his
superior knowledge rendering him liable only for injuries caused by latent or hidden
dangers. The court in Atherton held that an owner may avoid liability to an Invitee
either by maintaining a safe premises or by warning of the dangers. This court also added
that "[o]bviously, actual knowledge of defects and dangers is equivalent to, perhaps
better than, a warning." In Trimyer it was held that the duty to warn exists only in
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directed a verdict for the defendant, holding that since the hazard was
obvious the plaintiff failed to prove actionable negligence. On appeal, held,
reversed and remanded. Where shopping center owner should reasonably
anticipate harm to a shopper from an obvious ice hazard, he has a positive
duty to protect him, despite the shopper's knowledge. Hanson v. Town &
Country Shopping Center, 144 N.W.2d 870 (Iowa 1966).
While in a shopping center parking lot, a shopper has been held to be
a business visitor-invitee.3 Traditionally, a shopping center owner's invitation 4 to the buying public5 has been held to carry with it an implied obligation to exercise reasonable care 6 in maintaining his parking lot in a reasonrespect to latent dangers, not those -which are or ought to be obvious to an invitee; and to
sustain a charge of negligence, the unsafe condition must be one of which the owner
knew or should have known while the invitee did not know and could not reasonably have
discovered. The original Restatement predicated an owner's liability on his actual or
constructive knowledge of the hazard's'existence and on his having no reason to believe
that an invitee would discover or appreciate the danger, while the Restatement (Second)
altered this position by adding § 343A(1) providing that an owner is not liable for known
or obvious dangers unless he should anticipate the harm despite such knowledge or
obviousness. As the majority opinion pointed out, the REsrAtrE-r (ScOND), Tonrs, was
published after the lowa rule was established.
3 Hicks v. M.H.A. Inc., 107 Ga. App. 290, 129 SE2d 817 (1963); Brooks v. Sears,
Roebuck S: Co., 302 Mass. 184, 19 N.E.2d 39 (1939). The same rule is also applied to
commercial parking lots. Kelley v. Goldberg, 288 Mass. 78, 192 N.E. 513 (1938). Cf.
Indemaur v. Dames, L.R. 1 C.P. 274, 85 L.J.C.P. 184, afl'd L.R 2 C.P. 311, 36 LJ.C.P.
181 (1866) (landmark English case defining business visitor as invitee); accord, Bennett v.
Louisville & N.R.R., 102 U.S. (12 Otto) 577 (1880) (sanctioned early American courts'
adopting business visitor-invitee definition). See generally Shopping Center Parting Lot
Liability, 14 CLv.-MAR. L. REv. 570 (1965). There are two principal tests to determine
whether an individual has the status of an invitee: the "economic benefit" theory as
capsuled in PRossER, TORTS § 61 (3d ed. 1964) and the "invitation theory" stated in Bennett
v. Louisville and N.R.R. supra. The latter appears to be the most widely adopted. The
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 882 (3) defines an invitee as "a person who is invited to
enter or remain on land for a purpose directly or indirectly connected with business
dealings with the possessor of the land." See Prosser, Business Visitors and Invitees, 26
MLxu. L. REV. 573 (1942) in PRossER, SELErE Topics oN TnE LAw or ToRcs 243 (1954);
James, Tort Liability of Occupiers of Land: Duties Owed to Licensees and Invitees, 63
YA E L.J. 605 (1954).
4 Evans v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 104 S.W2d 1085, 1038 (Mo. App. 1937). Evans defined
the invitation of the owner as an implied invitation, one extended by reason of the
owner or occupant doing something which indicates to the person entering that his entry
and use is consistent with the intentions and purposes of the owner.
5 One need not make a purchase to be considered an invitee. Murphy v. Kelly, 15 NJ.
608, 105 A.2d 841 (1954) (child accompanying customer); Leighton v. Dean, 117 Me. 40,
102 Ati. 565 (1917) (window shopper); contra Petree v. Davison-Paxon Stores Co., S0 Ga.
App. 490, 118 S.E. 697 (1923).
6 E.g., Nelson v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 48 NJ. Super. S00, 137 A.2d 599
(1958) (owner owes same duty in parking lot as inside store). See generally Paossra,
TORTS § 82 (3d-ed. 1964).
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ably safe7 condition with respect to ice and snow hazards or in warning of
any dangerous condition.8 Generally, a parking lot owner has been held to
owe no duty to protect his patrons while the snowstorm is in progress.0
Furthermore, some jurisdictions have absolved the parking lot owner from
any duty to remove naturally accumulated snow and ice,' 0 provided his
premises are in an otherwise nonhazardous condition." Other courts have
held the owner liable for unnaturally accumulated snow and ice hazards
which caused injuries to shoppers in parking lots.' 2 However, since the
owner's duty is predicated upon his superior knowledge of his premises, 18
heretofore he has been held liable only for those parking lot ice and snow
hazards of which he is actually aware or should reasonably be expected to
discover through inspection. 14 Notwithstanding such liability, no owner
7 But see Knodsen v. Purfee-Freeman, Inc., 99 Ga. App. 520, 109 S.E.2d 339 (1959).

The court remarked that "it may fairly be said that the duty to keep the premises safe
(not reasonably safe) exists as to all persons who ... come on the premises at the express
or implied invitation of the owner." (Emphasis added.) However this rule has not been
followed in Georgia.
8 Bates v. Valley Fair Enterprises, 86 N.J. Super. 1, 205 A.2d 746 (1964) (reasonable
care to keep lot free of ice and snow); Merkel v. Safeway Stores Inc., 77 N.J. Super. 535,
187 A.2d 52 (1962) (liability may result from unreasonable failure to remove Ice and
snow); Fitz Simons v. National Tea Co., 29 Ill. App. 306, 173 N.E.2d 534 (1961) (Ice
hazard negligently allowed to exist violates implied obligation). See also Safe Place
Statutes, e.g., OHIO REV.

CODE ANN.

§§ 4101.01, 4101.11 and Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 101.01(11),

101.06, which elevate the common law duty of the parking lot owner to the level of a
state statute. But see Mosms, TORTs 157-162 (1953); Thayer, Public Wrong and Private
Action, 27 HARv. L. Rxv. 317 (1914). These writers argue the relative merits of whether
civil liability should follow the criminal law.
9 Carter v. Davis, 74 N.M. 443, 894 P.2d 594 (1964); Hallett v. Furr's, Inc., 71 N.M. 877,
378 P.2d 613 (1963). The reason for the holding that there is no liability in this situation
is (1) there must be an opportunity to clear the ice, and (2) where the ice is smooth the
owner has no greater duty to prevent injury than the invitee has to protect himself.
Carter v. Davis, supra.
1o Crenshaw v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 72 N.M. 84, 380 P.2d 828 (1963) (danger
is universally known and equally apparent to owner and invitee); Martinelli v. Cua, 115
Ohio App. 151, 184 N.E.2d 514 (1962) (no duty to warn and no liability where natural
accumulation).
11 Wise v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 94 Ohio App. 320, 115 N.E,2d 33 (1953);
Schrader v. Kriesel, 232 Minn. 238, 45 N.W.2d 395 (1950) (icy rut invisible because covered
by newly fallen snow).
12 Zide v. Jewel Tea Co., 89 Ill. App. 2d 217, 188 N.E.2d 383 (1963) (owner liable
if he actually caused unnatural accumulation); Fitz Simons v. National Tea Co., 29 I11,
App. 306, 173 N.E.2d 534 (1961) (snowplow created unnatural ruts during lot clearing
operations).
1a Crawford v. Soennichsen, 175 Neb. 87, 120 N.V.2d 578 (1968) (owner's liability is
predicated upon proof of superior knowledge); Hallett v. Furr's, Inc., 71 N.M. 377, 878
P.2d 618 (1963).
14 Hall v. Safeway Stores Inc., 360 S.W.2d 536 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962) (absent evidence
of actual or constructive knowledge, no owner's liability); Fitz Simons v. National Tea
Co., 29 Ill. App. 806, 173 N.E.2d 534 (1961) (actual knowledge inferred where snowplow
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has been held to be the insurer of his customers' absolute safety,1 5 nor has
the mere fact that a shopper was injured on a shopping center parking lot
previously been held to raise a rebuttable presumption of the owner's
negligence.1 6 Furthermore, ice and snow hazards which were known or
obvious to a shopper have been held to be equivalent to, perhaps better than,
a warning,17 giving rise to the traditional tort defenses.' 8 Moreover, some
courts have distinguished between known and appreciated ice and snow

hazards, holding that parking lot owners must protect their patrons from
obvious, though unappreciated dangers. 19 Finally, the parking lot owner's
duty has evolved into a positive requirement that, where he should reasonably anticipate a shopper's accident due to an obvious and appreciated ice
or snow hazard, he must safeguard the shopper from a slip-and-fall injury,
notwithstanding the shopper's knowledge of the danger.20
In the instant case, the Iowa Supreme Court has realistically updated
the parking lot owner's duty to protect his customers from winter weather
hazards by adopting the anticipated harm liability test advocated by the
created hazard while clearing lot); Morris v. Atlantic 9- Pacific Tea Co., 384 Pa. 464, 121
A.2d 135 (1956) (jury question whether ice existed for sufficient duration to constitute
notice).
15 Zermia v. Capital Court Corp., 21 Wis. 2d 164, 124 N.W.2d 86 (1963) (not owner's
duty to make premises absolutely safe from icy drizzle); Watts v. Holmes, 386 P.2d 718
(Wyo. 1963) (owner not insurer where invitee knows as much or more than he).
16 Cf. Sattler v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 18 F.R.D. 271 (W.D. La. 1955). See
also Raper v. McCrory-Mclfellan Corp., 259 N.C. 199, 130 S.E.2d 281 (1963) (res ipsa
loquitur doctrine held inapplicable to slip-and-fall cases).
17 Nolan v. United States, 186 F.2d 578 (4th Cir. 1951) (where obvious to Federal Tort
Claims Act liability); see also authorities cited note 2 supra. See generally Keeton,
Personal Injuries Resulting from Open and Obvious Conditions, 100 U. PA. I.. REv. 609

(1952).
1s Assumption of risk and contributory negligence are the two defenses most often
pleaded by property owners. E.g., Burch v. Moore's Super Market Inc., 397 S.W.2d 590
(Mo. 1965) (test: whether so obvious a danger that a reasonably prudent person would
avoid it). But see Mendez v. Pavich, 412 P.2d 223 (Colo. 1966) (test not only obviousness,
warning, and knowledge, but also all facts and circumstances). See generally 20 WAS,.
LEE L. REv. 153 (1963).
19 Williamson v. Derry Elec. Co., 89 N.H. 216, 196 Atl. 265 (1938); Morris v. Atlantic
&Pacific Tea Co., 384 Pa. 464, 121 A.2d 135 (1956); Cf. PROSSER, ToRys § 61, at 404 (3d ed.
1964); Keeton, Personal Injuries Resulting from Open and Obvious Conditions, supra
note 17, at 633. In Morris the court held that rough ice in a parking lot, though obvious,
constituted an inevitable pedestrian hazard when shoppers were pushing carts in front of
them.
20 King Soopers, Inc. v. Mitchell, 140 Colo. 119, 342 P.2d 1006 (1959). See also James,
Tort Liability of Occupiers of Land: Duties Owed to Licensees and Invitees, supra note
3. In King Soopers the shopper noticed icy condition, walked on it to the store, then
fell on way back to car. The court stated that, though the condition may be obvious, it
is of little help to the shopper who must cross the parking lot heavily burdened with
purchased goods. Under such circumstances, the shoppers knowledge and the degree of
care he exercises will not lessen the likelihood of injury.
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Restatement (Second), Torts section 343A (1964).21 While the new rule does
require an owner to exercise a higher degree of care:, 22 it does not impose
either absolute liability or an unreasonable standard of care. 23 However,
the decision is contra to the traditional view that there is no duty to protect
invitees against known hazards or those that are so apparent that they would
reasonably be expected to be discovered by the invitee.2 4 The most significant
effect of this decision seems to be the creation of a rebuttable presumption
of negligence by the owner, 25 a marked departure from the traditional
approach to slip-and-fall cases. 28 Consequently, it now seems that once the
plaintiff establishes a causal connection between an ice hazard on the
defendant's parking lot and his injury, the burden of proof shifts to the
defendant, requiring him to show that he, in fact, (1) did not create the
condition, (2) was not aware of it, and (3) should not; have anticipated any
harm to a customer. In addition, should one or more of the above inquiries
be answered affirmatively, the owner would then have to show that he took
reasonable precautions, in light of the circumstances, to make his premises
reasonably safe notwithstanding the hazard. 27 At this point, the owner may
21 That section states: "(1) A possessor of land is not liable to his invitees for physical
harm caused to them by any activity or condition on the land whose danger is known or
obvious to them, unless the possessor should anticipate the harm despite such knowledge
or obviousness ..
" (Emphasis added).
22 The court in the instant case determined the test to be:
... whether under all the facts and circumstances ... in the exercise of reasonable
care to make the premises reasonably safe for the [invitee], [the owner] should have
expected that despite the obviousness of the condition . . . [the shopper] would not
realize the hazard and would fail to protect herself against it.
Hanson v. Town & Country Shopping Center, 144 N.W.2d 870, 875 (Iowa 1966).
23 Id. at 874. The court specifically stated that "[t]he standard of reasonable care does
not require the premises to be free from all defects." Ibid.
24 See ibid; accord, Ware v. Cattaneo, 69 N.M. 394, 367 P.2d 705, 707 (1962) (plaintiff's
negligence does not change owner's duty). The court in Hanson concluded that:
To arbitrarily deny liability for open and obvious defects and apply liability only for
hidden defects, traps or pitfalls, is to adopt a rigid rule bated on objective classifica.
tion in place of the concept of the care of a reasonable and prudent man under the
particular circumstances.
Hanson v. Town & Country Shopping Center, 144 N.W.2d 870, 874 (Iowa 1966). It was also
added that the question is not one of contributory negligence or assumption of risk by
the [shopper], but rather that of primary negligence by the defendant.
,25 See Carroll, Supermarket Liability: Problems in Proving the Slip-and-Fall Case in
Florida, 18 U. FLA. L. REv. 440 (1965). The writer, in analyzing the slip-and-fall cases
inside the store, advocated shifting some of the burden of proof to the owner, i.e., liability
would be presumed when an injury resulted from a dangerous condition on the premises
unless the owner could show that (1) he did not create the hazard and (2) it did not exist
for a sufficient period to have been discovered and remedied. (Emphasis added.)
26 See note 16 supra.
27 See generally Green, The Causal Relation Issue in Negligence Law, 60 Micit, L. Rev.
543 (1962); Green, Foreseeability in Negligence Law, 61 CoLtm. L. Rav. 1401 (1961); 45
0xE. L. Rv. 124 (1966).
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raise the traditional tort defense allegations of contributory negligence and
assumption of risk. 28 Such a procedural allocation of the burden of proof
terminates the insulation from liability which the owner formerly enjoyed
under the traditional no duty rule, and it equitably distributes the requirement to produce evidence to the particular party with the easiest access
to such evidence. 29 While the positive duty rule created in the instant case
significantly increases the shopping center parking lot owner's liability
exposure, its impact can be substantially reduced by the implementation
of sounder management procedures for combating winter weather hazards.
The positive duty rule ultimately should provide an increase both in
shopping center owners' responsibility and in shoppers' safety.
28 See note 18 supra. See generally James, Assumption of Risk, 61 YAX LJ. 141 (1952.
29 Under the traditional no duty rule the plaintiff who, more often than not is

unaccompanied, finds it almost impossible to secure disinterested witnesses and, alone, faces
a difficult task proving the existence of the condition, the dangerous nature of it, and
the causation in fact, upon which to adequately allege negligence by the owner or his
representatives. See generally 46 B.U.L. REv. 231, 250 (1966) for a comparison of the
Connecticut (positive duty rule) and Massachusetts (no duty where obvious rule) positions
with a conclusion that shoppers "should be entitled to more adequate protection [than

the no duty rule provides] in return for their patronage."
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